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Introduction
　The Mekong River begins in China (where it is called the Lancang), and 
flows through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, before 
issuing in the South China Sea. It is the worldʼs 12th-longest river, flowing 
almost 4,900 kilometers from its source on the Tibetan plateau in Chinaʼs 
southwestern Qinghai province, 5,200 meters above sea level, and 72 million 
people depend on its resources for their livelihood.
　The Mekong basin has two distinct parts. The upper part is shared by 
China (16%) and Myanmar (2%); and the lower by the four other riparian 
countries: Laos (35%), Thailand (18%), Cambodia (18%) and Vietnam (11%) 
(see Figure 1). This two-part division is politically significant in terms of 
river basin management: both China and Myanmar operate independently in 
development of the mainstream river, while the lower Mekong basin 
countries cooperate according to the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for 
＜Article＞
The Prevention and Resolution of International Conflicts 
over Transboundary Water Resources 
in the Mekong River Basin
Jo TORIYABE＊
＊ Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Setsunan University, Japan. E-mail: jo.toriyabe@law.setsunan.
ac.jp This paper is a revised version of the one presented at an international conference 
from 12-14 December, 2019, at the Chatrium Hotel Riverside, in Bangkok, Thailand 
(International Conference on Policies, Laws and Regulations for Water Resources 
Management in Southeast Asia Countries), sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
of Germany and the Department of Water Resources of Thailand. The author wishes to 
express his heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Noriko Okubo, Professor at the Graduate School of 
Law and Politics, Osaka University. This study was supported by research grants from 
KWEF (the Kurita Water and Environment Foundation) in 2019 and the Asahi Glass 
Foundation in 2020. The responsibility for any errors belongs to the author.
2
摂南法学第58号〔2021.3〕
the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin (hereinafter the 
“1995 Agreement”)1). The management of this lower part of the basin is 
spearheaded by the Mekong River Commission (MRC)2), which was 
established in the 1995 Agreement and comprises Thailand, Laos, Cambodia 
and Vietnam.
　For years, China has been criticized for not joining the MRC, while 
unilaterally building dams on the most upstream section of the river; and its 
position appears, at last, to be gradually shifting in response. Since 2015, for 
example, China has become more closely involved in cross-border cooperation 
1) Signed and entered into force on April 5, 1995, at Chieng Rai, Thailand, UNTS, Vol. 2069 
(2002), p. 3.
Source: MRC, “Progress in Water Management at the River Basin 
Level: Mekong River Basin,” Presentation at 3rd WWF, INBO 
Official Session Otsu Prince Hotel, 20 March 2004, p. 9.
Figure 1: Configuration of the Mekong River basin
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in hydropower and water resource management in the Mekong River basin; 
and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Mechanism is a newly 
established, China-led initiative for cooperation on the Mekong River3). The 
LMC is thus emerging at a time when the status of the MRC as an existing 
transboundary water governance institution is in flux, while the Mekong 
riparian states are founding members of the new mechanism4).
　Due to the development of Chinese dams and the effects of severe drought 
in late 2015 and early 2016, the agricultural and fishery industries of Vietnam, 
Laos and Thailand were damaged, and the underground water near the 
Mekong Delta in Vietnam experienced seawater intrusion5). At the request 
of downstream countries, China released more water from the Jinghong 
Dam to downstream rivers in March 20166).
　According to the latest Mekong River Commission (MRC) analysis and 
available information, the 2019 drought has brought the Mekong water 
levels to their lowest point in living memory, or at least over the last 60 
years, with most parts of the basin having experienced exceptionally low 
regional flow since June 20197). Such a situation could have devastating 
consequences for the river fish, as well as the tens of millions of people living 
and working along the river. The crisis began when critical monsoon rains, 
which usually begin in late May 2019 in the Mekong region, failed to arrive. 
Dry conditions, driven by the El Niño weather phenomenon and exacerbated 
2) Cooperation in the Mekong river basin began in the middle of the 20th century with the 
formal signing of the Geneva Accords (1954), when the newly independent nations of 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam took their places on the world stage. In 1957, the United 
Nations-founded Mekong Committee (Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the 
Lower Mekong Basin) was established by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam during 
the 13th session of the United Nations Economic and Social Committee for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP), to address the comprehensive development of water and related resources 
in the lower Mekong Basin. However, lack of stability in the region resulted in the 
interruption of the Mekong Committee sessions in the late 1970s. In response to Cambodiaʼs 
absence, in 1977, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam adopted a new statute forming the basis of 
the Interim Mekong Committee. When Cambodia finally requested readmission in 1991, 
lengthy discussions began, which led to the eventual transformation of the Mekong 
Committee through the 1995 Agreement. See Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, “Transboundary River Basin Overview － Mekong,” FAO AQUASTAT 
Reports (2011), pp. 9-10. See also Greg Browder & Leonard Ortolano, “The Evolution of an 
International Water Resources Management Regime in the Mekong River Basin,” Natural 
Resources Journal, Vol. 40 (2000), pp. 504-525.
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by climate change, persisted well into July 2019. At that time, observers say, 
the situation was made worse by upstream hydropower dam operators in 
China and Laos withholding water for their own purposes; and Chinaʼs 
decision to halve the water released from its Jinghong Dam for two weeks 
in July, for “grid maintenance,” is likely a major contributor to 2019ʼs 
historically low water levels in the Mekong River8). Ultimately, the above 
situations suggest that even if cooperative arrangements are in place, 
disagreements over existing and planned transboundary hydropower 
developments are inevitable. Thus, the need to have effective dispute 
avoidance and dispute settlement mechanisms in place to resolve any 
differences will be an important factor in any future development.
　However, the Mekong countries have different interests in exploiting 
3) The main events relating to the development of cooperation in the LMC framework are 
as follows. The framework was established in November 2015, just one year after Chinese 
Premier Li Keqiang formally put forward the initiative at the 17th China-ASEAN Summit, 
held in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, in November 2014. In March 2016, the first LMC leadersʼ 
meeting was held, and the Sanya Declaration was adopted. In December 2016, the second 
LMC foreign ministersʼ meeting was held in Siem Reap, Cambodia. In March 2017, the 
China Secretariat for the LMC was established in Beijing, China. In December 2017, the 
third LMC foreign ministersʼ meeting was held in Dali, Yunnan, China. In January 2018, the 
second LMC leadersʼ meeting was held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and the Phnom Penh 
Declaration and Five-Year Plan of Action on the LMC (2018-2020) were adopted. In 
December 2018, the fourth LMC foreign ministersʼ meeting was held in Luang, Prabang, 
Laos. In July 2019, the MRC Secretariat was granted observer status in the LMC Joint 
Working Group on Water Resources, and China and the MRC agreed to renew their 
agreement on the provision of hydrological information during the flood season. With the 
increased cooperation, China agreed to maintain the same period and frequency of 
hydrological data sharing. The sharing takes place twice a day over five months, from June 
1st until October 31st, every year. The MRC and China signed the first data sharing 
agreement in 2002, and renewed it in 2008 and 2013. See David J. Devlaeminck, “Timeline 
of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Mechanism,” (2019), available at https://www.
academia.edu/36426349/Timeline_of_the_Lancang-Mekong_Cooperation_LMC_
Mechanism_Last_Updated_August_2_2019_ (last access 21 December, 2019); MRC Website, 
MRC and China renew pact on water data provision and other cooperation initiatives, 
Vientiane, Laos, on 19 Jul 2019, available at http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/
news/mrc-and-china-renew-pact-on-water-data-provision-and-other-cooperation-initiatives/ 
(last access 21 December 2019). The LMC, however, originated with Thailandʼs proposal of 
the Conference on Sustainable Development in the Lancang-Mekong subregion, which 
aimed to establish means to address challenges, such as natural disasters, faced by all six 
Mekong riparian countries, and explore possible cooperation for sustainable development. 
Poowin Bunyavejchewin, “The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Viewed in Light of the 
Potential Regional Leader Theory,” Journal of Mekong Societies, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2016), p. 55.
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water resources; China and Laos, for example, typically pay far more 
attention to hydropower development than the lower riparian states. The 
MRC estimates that Laos will receive 70% of the export revenues (US$2.6 
billion per year) generated by the mainstream dams once all of them are 
operational9); while China, due to its current energy shortage, has an acute 
need of electricity for its own development10). Fisheries on the Mekong 
account for 12% of Cambodiaʼs gross domestic product (GDP), and provide 
its people with a vital source of nutrition11); while the Vietnamese part of the 
Mekong Delta, the Cuu Long region, accounts for 33% of Vietnamʼs 
prosperous agricultural sector and 90% of its rice exports, which are the 
third largest in the world12). In a critical development, China has become the 
largest stakeholder in transboundary water issues, both through its control 
4) Until April 2015, the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) was the only Mekong forum to 
include all six riparians. The GMS was initiated by the Asian Development Bank in 1992, 
to integrate the Mekong region through the construction of power, transport and 
communication networks. The forum is attractive to China because it focuses on 
infrastructure development, improving power, transportation and communication networks 
between Yunnan Province and the Indochina states. It does not impose strict aquatic 
environmental standards or dam-building restrictions on its members, so Chinaʼs 
sovereignty and freedom of action are not compromised. Elvira Bobekova, Scott Pearse-
Smith & Isak Svensson, “Rivers of Peace Institutionalised Mekong River Cooperation and 
the East Asian Peace,” European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 12 (2013), p. 20; Selina 
Ho, “‘Big Brother, Little Brothersʼ: Comparing Chinaʼs and Indiaʼs Transboundary River 
Policies,” Water Policy, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2016), p. 38; Selina Ho, “Chinaʼs Transboundary River 
Policies Towards Kazakhstan: Issue-linkages and Incentives for Cooperation,” Water 
International, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2017), p. 146. The LMCʼs purview is much broader than the 
GMS, which has the same membership. Most striking is the inclusion of cooperation on 
water resources, an issue which has been far outside the remit of the GMS.
5) Xing Wei, “Lancang-Mekong River Cooperation and Trans-Boundary Water Governance,” 
China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2017), p. 386.
6) Ibid.
7) MRC Website, Mekong water levels reach low record, Vientiane, Laos, on 18 July 2019, 
available at http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mekong-water-levels-
reach-low-record/ (last access 20 January 2021).
8) National Geographic Website, Mekong River at its lowest in 100 years, threatening food 
supply, on 31 July 2019, available at https://www.nationalgeographic.com/
environment/2019/07/mekong-river-lowest-levels-100-years-food-shortages/ (last access 20 
January 2021).





of the upstream waters of key international basins, and through its economic, 
financial and political engagement, regarding water infrastructure, with the 
five other countries in the Mekong River basin. Even the parties subject to 
the 1995 Agreement, however, have found it difficult to reconcile their 
varying interests with respect to hydropower developments on the 
mainstream of the Mekong River, such as Laosʼs Xayaburi Hydroelectric 
Project on the lower Mekong (discussed below).
　In light of the need for equitable and reasonable water sharing and water 
benefit sharing among all the Mekong basin countries, this article argues for 
and proposes a number of mechanisms requisite for establishing the rule of 
international law in the context of large-scale dam development in the 
Mekong mainstream, and suggests means of preventing and resolving 
international conflicts over transboundary water resources in the Mekong 
River basin. The rule of international law — that is, the rule of law at the 
international level — is a conceptual basis for proper governance of the 
international community. The objective of contemporary laws regarding 
international watercourses should be to relieve water stress among states 
that share such watercourses, and thereby enhance the water security of all 
riparian basin states. The rule of international law is fundamentally necessary 
to achieve this objective.
　In order to help establish the rule of international law in the Mekong 
basin, this article will identify deficiencies in current management 
mechanisms such as the MRC and LMC, with respect to the development of 
large-scale dams along the Mekong River; and then present a model for 
achieving integrated water resource management throughout the basin, to 
overcome such deficiencies. Its central issues are examined primarily from 
two angles: the relationship between the countries in the lower Mekong 
River, and the relationship between the lower Mekong River countries and 
China, the most upstream country. 
　Structurally, the article first considers the political and economic 
implications for the region, of large-scale dam development in the Mekong 
River basin (see Section I A), and then reviews the transboundary water 
12) Ibid.
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resource management mechanisms related to dam development, having 
been established by the Mekong River basin countries (see I B). In addition, 
it identifies shortcomings in the current transboundary water resource 
management mechanisms in the Mekong River basin (see II). Finally it asks, 
if these mechanisms should not prove effective for sustainable development 
in the overall river basin, how may they be improved in accordance with the 
rule of international law (see Ⅲ).
I.  Development of Large-scale Dams on the Mekong River 
Mainstream and the Current State of MRC  
and LMC Management
A. Background
1.  Energy Demand in the Mekong River Basin
　The regionʼs economic wealth and population, particularly in the urban 
centers, have grown dramatically in recent years; and this has been 
accompanied by a growing demand for electricity, especially in China, 
Thailand and Vietnam. China needs power to sustain its GDP growth, which 
remains above 6-7% per year; Thailandʼs government estimates that the 
countryʼs electricity demands will double to 58,000 megawatts (MW) by 2021; 
and Vietnamʼs government estimates that its demand will rise from about 
48,600 MW currently to 60,000 MW by 2020 and 129,500 MW by 2030. Laos 
also views hydropower as necessary for the development of its mineral 
deposits, and Cambodiaʼs demand is driven in part by the need to provide 
more and cheaper energy for domestic consumption, and to satisfy the needs 
of nascent light industries such as garment manufacturing13).
2.  Large-scale Dam Development in the Mekong River Mainstream
　China, the most upstream country on the Mekong River, has built, or plans 




diversion facilities, which has triggered anxiety and complaints from 
downstream countries, as well as worldwide criticism14). As shown in Figure 
2, China currently operates a cascade of 10 dams on the stretch of the upper 
Mekong in Yunnan Province (at Nuozhadu, Xiaowan, Huangdeng, Jinghong, 
Manwan, Miaowei, Dachaoshan, Gongguoqiao, Wunonglong, Lidi), with a 
total installed capacity of 20,430 MW15); and if the hydropower-generation 
capacity of future dams (Gushui, Ru Mei, Tuoba, Banda, Dahuaqiao, Ganlanba, 
Cege, Yue Long) is considered, its hydropower output could increase by 
another 8,473MW16). 
　In the words of US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, China is taking 
control of the flow of Southeast Asiaʼs most important river through a dam-
building “spree,” at the same time as water levels along the Mekong reach 
record lows17); and its upstream development of hydropower dams and other 
riverine infrastructure has been pursued with relative disregard for the less 
powerful downstream riparian states of Southeast Asia18). However, China 
has insisted on a positive interpretation of the impact of its dam construction, 
arguing that dams can release more water into the river during the dry 
season, and provide flood control during wet season19). Therefore, it claims 
that the dams will have little negative impact on the lower basin. In fact, 
14) China is quite clearly the most important upstream country for transboundary water in 
Asia. Its territory includes the ‘Asian Water Towersʼ of the Tibetan-Qinghai Plateau, and 
110 international rivers and lakes along its southwest, northwest and northeast borders; 
and it is the source of Asiaʼs great rivers, which flow into 18 downstream countries. Owen 
McIntyre, “Benefit-sharing and Upstream/Downstream Cooperation for Ecological 
Protection of Transboundary Waters: Opportunities for China as an Upstream State,” in 
Patricia Wouters, Huiping Chen & James. E. Nickum (eds.), Transboundary Water 
Cooperation: Principles, Practice and Prospects for China and Its Neighbours (Routledge, 
2017), p. 197.
15) See Mekong River Commission, State of the Basin Report 2018 (MRC, 2019), p. 181.
16) Ibid.
17) South China Morning Post Website, China ‘taking control’ of vital Mekong river through 
dam-building spree, Mike Pompeo warns, on 2 August 2019, available at https://www.scmp.
com/news/china/article/3021062/china-taking-control-vital-mekong-river-through-dam-
building-spree-mike (last access 15 December 2019).
18) McIntyre, 2017, supra note 14, pp. 197-198.
19) Selina Ho, “River Politics: Chinaʼs Policies in the Mekong and the Brahmaputra in 
Comparative Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 23, No. 85 (2014), p. 9.
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however, Chinaʼs dams are likely to have a significant negative impact on the 
downstream countries in numerous respects, including a drop in the water 
level, reduction of fisheries and crop production, and degradation of the 
ecosystems. A growing number of research papers have carefully assessed 
the possible impact of Chinaʼs dams on downstream regions20), and increased 
tension can certainly be expected between China and the lower basin 
riparian states as China continues its cascade of hydropower dam construction 
on the upper mainstream. Among other concerns, there is a fear that the 
huge storage capacity of its mainstream dams will effectively give China 
unilateral control over the release of water to downstream nations21).
Source: Stimson Center (https://www.stimson.org/2020/mekong-
mainstream-dams/) (last access 30 November 2020)
Figure 2: Mainstream dams in the Mekong River basin
20) E.g. Seungho Lee, “Benefit Sharing in the Mekong River Basin,” in Patricia Wouters, 
Huiping Chen & James E. Nickum (eds.), Transboundary Water Cooperation: Principles, 
Practice and Prospects for China and Its Neighbours (Routledge, 2017), p. 309.
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　In light of the foregoing, we should be concerned that the results of MRC 
analysis have typically reflected Chinaʼs position. A report by the MRC in 
2017, for example, concluded that its dams do not adversely affect the water 
flow: rather than creating floods in the wet season and exacerbating drought 
in the dry season, the dams reduce the flow during the wet season and 
increase it during the dry season, as China has claimed22).
　Meanwhile, Laos, comparatively upstream in the lower Mekong River 
basin, completed construction and commenced commercial operation of its 
Xayaburi Dam in October 2019. The dam, roughly 350 kilometers upstream 
of Vientiane, has a total installed capacity of 1,285 MW and annual energy 
production of 7,406 gigawatt-hours23). It is the first dam to be built in the 
mainstream of the lower reaches of the Mekong River, and this makes it 
subject to the ‘prior consultationʼ requirement under the 1995 Agreement 
(see Section I B 1). Had the MRC failed to prevent Laos from proceeding 
with the planning and construction phase before the assessment of 
transboundary impacts of the dam had been completed, it would have 
demonstrated the institutionʼs inability to manage its members (see Section 
II A 2). However, the problem was resolved in 2015, not through the MRC, 
but via the Thai Supreme Administrative Court24).
3.  Chinaʼs Increased Investment in the Lower Mekong Basin Countries
　Reconciling seemingly competing national interests will be key to 
addressing transboundary challenges in the Mekong River basin. Most 
notably, China plays a major role in the geopolitical landscape of the Mekong, 
not only as a powerful upstream state, but also by providing loans for and 
investing in major infrastructure projects downstream, which results in 
reluctance on the part of the recipients to openly challenge its upstream 
21) Scott W.D. Pearse-Smith, “‘Water Warʼ in the Mekong Basin?” Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 
Vol. 53, No. 2 (2012), p. 153.
22) MRC, State of the Basin Report 2018, supra note 15, p. 174; MRC Website, The effects of 
Chinese dams on water flows in the Lower Mekong Basin, Vientiane, Laos, on 6 Jun 2017, 
available at http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/the-effects-of-chinese-
dams-on-water-flows-in-the-lower-mekong-basin/ (last access 20 January 2021).
23) Pt (Sole) Company Limited Website, available at http://www.ptsole.com/xayaburi (last 
access 15 December 2015).
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activities on the Mekong25).
　From 2006 to 2011, for example, China invested over $6.1 billion in the 
hydropower sectors of which three countries alone26). According to Chinese 
government data, in 2015, Chinaʼs total trade with Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, 
Thailand and Vietnam reached US$193.9 billion27), and China is the most 
important donor, creditor and foreign investor in Laos and Cambodia. Its 
loans to Laos, for example, accounted for roughly 35% of that countryʼs 
public debt in 201228), 44% by 201529), and 50% by 2018 when its public debt 
was estimated to represent roughly 68% of its GDP30). Around half the 
24) The Xayaburi dispute prompted a case to be lodged with a Thai administrative court by 
30 villagers who might have been affected by the project. The case challenged the decision 
of the Thai government to approve the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) between the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand and the Xayaburi Power Company Limited. 
In August 2012, the group of 30 villagers filed a lawsuit in Thailandʼs Administrative Court 
against the relevant Thai government agencies. In February 2013, the Administrative 
Court of Thailand denied jurisdiction to hear the case because the plaintiffs could not be 
considered injured persons, and the court did not deem the conclusion of the PPA to be an 
administrative act. The plaintiffs filed an appeal in March 2013. In June 2014, the Thai 
Supreme Administrative Court accepted the case, stating, “evidence suggests that relevant 
authorities have failed to adequately listen to the opinions of the people and to comply with 
the PNPCA…”. In October 2014, the villagers filed an injunction with the Administrative 
Court, requesting a halt to the construction of the dam while the Supreme Administrative 
Court ruled on the legality of the PPA. However, in December 2015, the Supreme 
Administrative Court dismissed the case on the basis that “the defendants did not neglect 
their duty,” and that the PPA fulfilled the required notification and consultation procedures. 
See Business & Human Rights Resource Centre Website, Xayaburi dam lawsuit (re Laos & 
Thailand), available at https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/xayaburi-dam-lawsuit-
re-laos-Thailand (last access 16 December 2019).
25) Bennett Bearden, Alistair Rieu-Clarke & Sokhem Pech, “Mekong Basin,” in Flavia Rocha 
Loures & Alistair Rieu-Clarke (eds.), The UN Watercourses Convention in Force: 
Strengthening International Law for Transboundary Water Management (Routledge, 2013), 
pp. 182-183.
26) U.S. Energy Information Administration Website, Chinese investments play large role in 
Southeast Asia hydroelectric growth, on 16 August 2013, available at  https://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=12571# (last access 16 December 2019).
27) Wang Yan, “Mekong countries look to bolster cooperation,” chinadialogue, on 5 April 
2018, available at https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10559-Mekong-
countries-look-to-bolster-cooperation (last access 23 December 2019).
28) ASEAN Today, Why Laos’ reliance on Chinese money could bankrupt the country, on 22 
February 2018, available at https://www.aseantoday.com/2018/02/why-laos-reliance-on-




borrowed money is from China, and China has now edged out Thailand and 
Vietnam to become Laosʼs largest foreign investor, with accumulative 
Chinese investment in Laos standing at US $5.1 billion as of January 201431). 
In Cambodia, meanwhile, Chinese loans and grants amounted to US$2.7 
billion in 2012, making China Cambodiaʼs second-largest donor after Japan32). 
4.  Self-financing of the MRC
　Established in the 1995 Agreement between the governments of Cambodia, 
Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, the MRC had a total annual budget of roughly 
US$12.4 million in 2017, including both basket and earmarked funding33). 
Over the current 2016-2020 period, its total annual expenditures are forecast 
to decline to just under US$11 million, of which approximately 38% is 
expected to be financed by the member countries, suggesting that the MRC 
is just on track to be self-financed by 203034). 
　In January 2016, it was announced that the principally Western donor-
funded MRC would have its budget cut by over half, to US$53 million for the 
period 2016-2020, significantly reducing its capability35). This funding cut was 
partially the result of the donorsʼ own reduced aid budgets, but was also 
based on doubts regarding the MRCʼs performance in facilitating the recent 
30) Ibid. In early 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) increased Laosʼ risk of 
“external debt distress” from moderate to high. IMF, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, on 
6 January 2017, available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/pdf/2017/
dsacr1753.pdf (last access 23 December 2019).
31) Ho, 2016, supra note 4, p. 37. In 2016, Cambodia saw the construction of six hydropower 
dams and all of them were built and financed entirely by Chinese companies. The ASEAN 
Post Website, Cambodia’s hydropower dilemma, on 19 August 2018, available at https://
theaseanpost.com/article/cambodias-hydropower-dilemma (last access 23 December 2019).
32) Ibid.
33) MRC, State of the Basin Report 2018, supra note 15, p.169.
34) Ibid.
35) Carl Middleton & Jeremy Allouche, “Watershed or Powershed? Critical Hydropolitics, 
China and the ‘Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Frameworkʼ” International Spectator, Vol. 51, 
No. 3 (2016), p. 113. Major donors included Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, 
Australia, the World Bank, the Netherlands, Japan, European Union, France and the United 
States. In particular, Denmarkʼs government gave US$86 million to the MRC over two 
decades, before ending its funding in 2015. Stephen Wright, “Mekong effort fails after years 
of lavish foreign funding,” The Associated Press, on 19 October 2016, available at https://
apnews.com/31978ed8726449dca8ba47c62816137a (last access 5 January 2020).
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decision-making processes around the Xayaburi and Don Sahong mainstream 
dams36).
5.  The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Mechanism
　According to its website, the LMC mechanism is structured in terms of a 
“3 + 5 Cooperation Framework,” with three areas of cooperation (political 
and security issues; economic and sustainable development; and social, 
cultural and person-to-person exchanges), and five priorities (connectivity, 
production capacity, cross-border economic cooperation, water resources, 
agriculture and poverty reduction)37).
　The LMC is especially significant because China has, for the first time, 
initiated a Mekong forum that includes all six riparian states. Moreover, the 
mechanism forms an integral part of Chinaʼs “One Belt, One Road” initiative, 
a development strategy that focuses on connectivity and infrastructure 
development among the Eurasian countries38).
　The LMC was established when the MRC was suffering from the 
aforementioned budgetary constraints, which provided a golden opportunity 
to demonstrate the importance of the mechanism39). While only around 16% 
of the Mekongʼs total annual flow originates in China, this volume provides 
China with further political power in the Mekong River basin, and a potential 
bargaining tool in negotiations with the other riparian states40).
36) Middleton & Allouche, 2016, supra note 35, p. 113.
37) LMC Website, 3 + 5 Cooperation Framework, on 14 December 2017, available at http://
www.lmcchina.org/eng/zyjz_3/35hz/t1519481.htm (last access 21 December 2019).
38) Ho, 2016, supra note 4, p. 38.
39) Imad Antoine Ibrahim, “Water Governance in the Mekong after the Watercourses 
Convention 35th ratification: Multilateral or Bilateral Approach?” International Journal of 
Water Resources Development, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2020), p. 205.
40) Pearse-Smith, 2012, supra note 21, p. 153.
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B.  The Current State of Transboundary Water Resource  
    Management Mechanisms in the Mekong River Basin
1.  The Relationship Between the Countries in the Lower Mekong River 
                 — Structure and Form of the MRC
(1) What is the MRC?
　The MRCʼs organizational structure consists of three permanent bodies; 
the Council, the Joint Committee and the Secretariat. The highest tier, which 
is the decision-making body, is the Council, which meets once a year and 
consists of one member from each country at the ministerial or cabinet 
level41). The Council makes policy decisions, and provides other necessary 
guidance concerning the promotion, support, cooperation and coordination of 
joint activities and programmes to implement the 1995 Agreement42). It has 
overall governance of the MRC.
　The Joint Committee (JC) consists of one member from each country at no 
less than the Head of Department level43). It is responsible for the 
implementation of the policies and decisions of the Council, and supervises 
the activities of the MRC Secretariat44). This body functions as a board of 
management.
　The Secretariat is the operational arm of the MRC45), providing technical 
and administrative services to the JC and the Council46), under the direction 
of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who is appointed by the Council47). Under 
the supervision of the JC, the CEO is responsible for the day-to-day operations 
of around 155 professional and general support staff48). In 2009 it was decided 
that the Secretariat would be permanently co-hosted in two locations, in 
41) 1995 Agreement, supra note 1, Article 15.
42) Ibid., Article 18.
43) Ibid., Article 21.
44) Ibid., Article 24.
45) Ibid., Article 30.
46) Ibid., Article 28.
47) Ibid., Article 31.
15
The Prevention and Resolution of International Conflicts 
over Transboundary Water Resources in the Mekong River Basin
Vientiane (Laos) and Phnom Penh (Cambodia). The Assistant CEO is of the 
same nationality as the JC Chair, and serves a one-year term. The main 
national counterparts for MRC activities in the four member countries are 
the National Mekong Committees (NMCs), coordinating bodies linking the 
MRC to the national governments.
　The MRC has developed procedures for information sharing and 
generating mutual agreements on projects that may affect the Mekong 
River resources. Based on Article 25 of the 1995 Agreement49), the following 
five rules of procedure have been adopted: (i) Procedures for Data and 
Information Exchange and Sharing (PDIES) (approved in 2001); (ii) Procedures 
for Water Use Monitoring (PWUM) (approved in 2003); (iii) Procedures for 
Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA) (approved in 2003); 
(iv) Procedures for the Maintenance of Flows on the Mainstream (PMFM) 
(approved in 2006); (v) Procedures for Water Quality (PWQ) (approved in 
2007)50). Of chief importance is the PNPCA, which builds on the 1995 
Agreement, to set out in detail the procedures that parties must follow to 
communicate the potential impacts of proposed uses of the Mekong basin, as 
well as the responsibilities of the various agencies in this process.
　While Article 39 of the 1995 Agreement allows China and Myanmar to 
become full members, the latter have thus far participated only as “dialogue 
partners” in the work of the MRC51). The MRC and China did sign agreements 
in 2002, 2008 and 2013, on the provision of hydrological information on the 
section of the Mekong River in Chinaʼs territory52); and on July 19, 2019, 
48) FAO, 2011, supra note 2, p. 10; Richard Kyle Paisley, Riley T. Denoon, Theressa Etmanski 
& Patrick Weiler, Transboundary Waters, Infrastructure Development and Public Private 
Partnership: Through the Prism of the Nam Thuen 2 and Xayaburi Hydropower Projects 
(Brill, 2017), p. 31.
49) Article 25 provides that: “The Joint Committee shall propose its own Rules of Procedures 
to be approved by the Council.” 1995 Agreement, supra note 1, Article 25.
50) See the MRC website for details of the five procedures. available at http://www.
mrcmekong.org/about-mrc/mandate/ (last access 5 January 2020). Noteworthy, however, 
is that all the above-mentioned procedures are external to the 1995 Agreement, and it is 
questionable whether they are legally binding. This article considers them to be legally 
binding for the time being.
51) Patricia Wouters & Huiping Chen, “Chinaʼs ‘Soft-Pathʼ to Transboundary Water 
Cooperation Examined in the Light of Two UN Global Water Conventions － Exploring the 
‘Chinese Wayʼ” Journal of Water Law, Vol. 22 (2013), p. 239.
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China agreed to continue sharing hydrological data with the MRC, which 
will contribute to better river monitoring and flood forecasting in the Mekong 
countries. However, China has adamantly refused to join the MRC, primarily 
because it does not want to be subject to the MRCʼs procedures on aquatic 
environmental issues and restrictions on dam building53), fearings that 
multilateralism will encroach on its sovereign rights and freedom of action 
in managing a key natural resource54).
(2)  Enforcement Mechanism — How Do the 1995 Agreement (Article 5) 
and PNPCA Work?
　The PNPCA requirements cover five possible situations, depending on a 
combination of the following three water-use factors: the type of river 
(mainstream or tributary), the season (dry or wet) and the scope of water 
use (inter-basin or intra-basin): (i) if dam development with inter-basin 
diversion is to be carried out on the mainstream during the dry season, the 
consent of potentially affected states is required; (ii) if dam development with 
intra-basin diversion is to be carried out on the mainstream during the dry 
season, the planning state is required to conduct prior consultation with the 
potentially affected states; (iii) if dam development with inter-basin diversion 
is to be carried out on the mainstream during the wet season, the planning 
state is required to conduct prior consultation with the potentially affected 
states; (iv) if dam development with intra-basin diversion is to be carried out 
on the mainstream during the wet season, mere notification to potentially 
affected states is sufficient; (v) if dam development is carried out on a 
tributary, mere notification to potentially affected states is sufficient (see 
Figure 3). As we can see, dry-season water use is subject to more demanding 
supervision than wet-season use; and inter-basin diversion, where water is 
diverted from the Mekong basin to another river basin, is subject to a more 
52) MRC Website, MRC and China renew pact on water data provision and other cooperation 
initiatives, Vientiane, Laos, on 19 July 2019, available at http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-
and-events/news/mrc-and-china-renew-pact-on-water-data-provision-and-other-
cooperation-initiatives/ (last access 17 December 2019).
53) Ho, 2014, supra note 19, p. 8.
54) Ibid., p. 3.
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thorough process than intra-basin water use. The construction of mainstream 
dams without proper adherence to the prior-consultation requirement has 
therefore put the credibility of the MRC to the test, and has increased the 
risk of conflict in the region55).
　Notification means that any country proposing a project must provide 
details of the project to the other member countries before commencement 
of the project. Prior Consultation refers to a six-month process of technical 
evaluation and formal consultations, where notified member states have an 
opportunity to assess potential transboundary impacts on ecosystems and 
livelihoods, and recommend measures to address issues of concern, before 
water is used. Specific Agreement means that thorough consultation and 
negotiation must be conducted to achieve a consensus among all the member 
states, on the terms and conditions of any proposed project, prior to the 
proposed water use. Since 1998, there have been 49 Notifications, 4 Prior 
Consultations, and no Specific Agreements56); but since 2012, Laos is the only 
country to have given notification of any projects for Prior Consultation 
under the PNPCA57).
55) MRC Website, Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA), 
p. 3, available at http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/PNPCA-brochure-11th-
design-final.pdf (last access 16 December 2019).
56) MRC, State of the Basin Report 2018, supra note 15, p. 166.
57) Ibid.
Source: MRC Website, available at http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/
PNPCA-brochure-11th-design-final.pdf (last access 16 December 2019)
Figure 3: Procedural obligations binding lower Mekong basin countries
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2.   The Relationship Between the Lower Mekong River Countries and 
China — the Establishment of a New Cooperation Mechanism (LMC)
　While the LMC mechanism is far from being a river basin organization (an 
entity established to manage water resources straddling different countries 
that share one river), it is notable that China has been the driving force 
behind an initiative that explicitly includes water issues within its remit58). 
China has long held the position that building water infrastructure on 
international rivers is not a multilateral issue59). Although some of the 
watercourses at issue are shared between several countries, the water 
treaties signed by China are primarily bilateral in nature60). Effectively, China 
seeks to protect its interests by conducting direct negotiations with the 
individual states with whom it shares surface water61). It should be noted 
that, strictly speaking, the current LMC is also not a multilateral framework, 
but only a bilateral one between China and the lower Mekong River 
countries.
　Chinaʼs active support for establishment of the LMC likely reflects at least 
the following three aims: to expand its market in order to address its 
excessive capacity issues and internationalize the Yuan62); to improve its 
increasingly negative public image in Southeast Asia63); and as a countermove 
to the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) established by the US in July 200964), 
because China fears the US could use the water disputes in the Mekong 
River to drive a wedge between China and its neighbors65). In this sense, the 
LMC is Chinaʼs response to the LMI and an attempt to exercise benevolent 
58) Hongzhon Zhang & Mingjiang Li, “China and Global Water Governance: New 
Developments,” in Hongzhon Zhang & Mingjiang Li (eds.), China and Transboundary Water 
Politics in Asia (Routledge, 2018), p. 227.
59) Ibrahim, 2020, supra note 39, p. 204.
60) E.g. the 1994 Agreement on Protection and Utilization of Border Waters (with Mongolia), 
the 2001 Cooperation Agreement on the Utilization and Protection of Transboundary 
Rivers (with Kazakhstan), and the 2008 Agreement on Reasonable Utilization and Protection 
of Transboundary Waters (with Russia). See also Yu Su, “Contemporary Legal Analysis of 
Chinaʼs Transboundary Water Regimes: International Law in Practice,” in Patricia Wouters, 
Huiping Chen & James E. Nickum (eds.), Transboundary Water Cooperation: Principles, 
Practice and Prospects for China and Its Neighbours (Routledge, 2017), pp. 161, 167-168.
61) Ibrahim, 2020, supra note 39, p. 204.
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leadership in the Mekong region.
62) Patricia Wouters argues that China imposes constrains on itself with respect to its 
riparian neighbors because it observes “limited territorial sovereignty,” which “means that 
national sovereign interests and actions are prescribed and circumscribed through rules of 
international law, both substantive and procedural”. Patricia Wouters, “The Yin and Yang 
of International Water Law: Chinaʼs Transboundary Water Practice and the Changing 
Contours of State Sovereignty,” Review of European, Comparative and International 
Environmental Law, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2014), p. 73. Wouters also argues that “From an 
international legal perspective, Chinaʼs approach to dealing with its riparian neighbors is 
based on dialogue, consultation and peaceful negotiations, and crafted around the notion of 
restricted territorial sovereignty”. Ibid., p. 72. According to this argument, China faces an 
“upstream dilemma”: how to meet its domestic water needs while taking into account the 
needs of neighboring countries in line with its policy of good neighborliness. See Ho, 2017, 
supra note 4, p. 147. However, China has demonstrated that it is not averse to using water 
as a political weapon to control and force compliance on its downstream neighbors. For 
instance, Article 10 of the 2013 MOU on sharing hydrological information between India 
and China states that India must pay RMB 850,000 to compensate China for this data 
provision. Yet China provides the data free of cost to Bangladesh, as mentioned in Article 
4 of the 2008 MOU on the Provision of Hydrological Information of the Yarlung Zangbo/
Brahmaputra River in Flood Season. Anamika Barua, Sumit Vij & Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman, 
“Powering or Sharing Water in the Brahmaputra River Basin,” International Journal of 
Water Resources Development, Vol. 34, No. 5 (2018), p. 837. This illustrates how Chinaʼs 
diplomatic strategy varies according to the country it is dealing with.
63) In early 2010, China was confronted with unparalleled criticism of its dam building, after 
record low water levels in the Mekong led to smaller fish catches, less water for irrigated 
agriculture, livestock and drinking, and suspended river transportation affecting trade and 
tourism. The media and NGOs blamed the operators of the large reservoir behind Chinaʼs 
Xiaowan dam for aggravating severe drought conditions at the time. As a result, China had 
to switch to a mode of “damage control” in order to calm the waves. China took 
unprecedented steps by sharing dry-season hydrological data from two of its mainstream 
dams (Manwan and Jinghong) during the crisis, and invited Mekong country representatives 
to visit the Jinghong dam for a tour inspection. Sebastian Biba, “China drives water 
cooperation with Mekong countries,” chinadialogue, on 1 February 2016, available at 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/8577-China-drives-water-
cooperation-with-Mekong-countries (last access 23 December 2019). See also Sebastian Biba, 
China’s Hydro-politics in the Mekong: Conflict and Cooperation in Light of Securitization 
Theory (Routledge, 2018), pp. 96-161.
64) See Pich Charadine, “Cambodia in the Context of Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC): 
Progress and Ways Forward,” Working Paper (2018), p. 15. In 2009, the US launched the 
LMI, a multinational partnership including Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and 
Vietnam, to create integrated sub-regional cooperation. The Initiative has six pillars: 
agriculture and food security, connectivity, education, energy security environment and 
water and health. Wei, 2017, supra note 5, p. 389. 
65) Zhang & Li, 2018, supra note 58, p. 228.
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II.  Problems with the Existing Transboundary Water Resource  
Management Mechanisms in the Mekong River Basin
A.  The Relationship Between the Countries in the Lower 
Mekong River — Problems with the MRC
1.  Limited Membership of the MRC Framework
　China and Myanmar, the two upstream riparians, are only affiliated with 
the MRC as dialogue partners, and their contribution to the institution has 
been minor. Although the 1995 Agreement has a provision for extending the 
Commission to include these countries66), and MRC member states have 
expressed their desire for China and Myanmar to become full-fledged 
members, the two countries have yet to show interest in doing so. According 
to China, the 1995 Agreement only imposes obligations on the upstream 
countries [e.g. notification and prior consultation (Chapter II ), maintenance 
of flows on the mainstream (Article 6), prevention of harmful effects (Article 
7) and state responsibility for damages (Article 8)], and fails to acknowledge 
the benefits provided by the upstream dams to the downstream regions (e.g. 
reduction of flood damage during the wet season and maintenance of flows 
by periodic dam water discharge during the dry season). Further, Myanmar 
has little interests in regional water resource management, because the 
Mekong River only touches a minor part of an inaccessible region of this 
country.
　Due to China and Myanmarʼs comparative non-participation in the MRC, 
its authority is limited in three critical respects: firstly, without the two 
countries, the MRC has no legitimacy to manage the entire Mekong basin; 
secondly, the two countries have no obligation to adhere to the MRCʼs 
procedures of cooperation in the management of the river basin areas within 
their territories; and thirdly, if Chinaʼs dams were to create negative 
externalities for the downstream countries, the latter would have little 
means to influence Chinaʼs dam management through the MRC. Therefore, 
66) 1995 Agreement, supra note 1, Article 39.
21
The Prevention and Resolution of International Conflicts 
over Transboundary Water Resources in the Mekong River Basin
as long as China, and to a lesser extent Myanmar, does not become a member 
of the MRC, the ability to generate cooperation in the overall basin by means 
of the MRC is severely restricted.
2.  Weakness of the MRCʼs Enforcement Mechanism
　The 1995 Agreement is less binding than the previous regimes. The 1957 
Agreement and the 1975 Joint Declaration of the Mekong Committee, which 
was the MRCʼs predecessor, both contained explicit veto rights and prior 
notification principles enabling riparian states to block unilateral action, 
which were removed in drafting the 1995 Agreement. As aforementioned, a 
member state must simply notify the others of activities in the tributaries 
within its territory; and for mainstream projects, prior consultation with 
other member states is required as a basis for arriving at an agreement, but 
consensus is not mandatory. Therefore, the MRC has effectively no 
instruments to enforce the 1995 Agreement if one of the members should 
pursue unilateral action.
3.  Weakness of the MRCʼs Dispute Resolution Mechanism
　The dispute resolution procedures in the 1995 Agreement are as follows. 
First, the MRC is responsible in the first instance for addressing any 
disagreements, where applicable, via the Council or the JC67). If the MRC 
cannot resolve the dispute at this stage, the issue is referred to the respective 
governments, to be resolved diplomatically68). If this also proves unsatisfactory, 
the countries may refer the issue to a third party, such as international 
organization, international professional group or individual for mediation69). 
Finally, the countries may appeal to the principles of international law70). In 
sum, then, the MRC in fact has no ultimate legitimacy or power to resolve 
conflicts.
　In contrast, the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
67) Ibid., Article 34.





International Watercourses71) (hereinafter the “1997 UN Watercourses 
Convention”), has a specific provision in Article 33 that grant compulsory 
jurisdiction to a “Fact-finding Commission”72), whose review is initiated by 
the referral of one of the concerned parties. The 1997 UN Watercourses 
Convention may provide a means for concerned parties to collaborate and 
engage in joint fact-finding, hopefully for leading to recommendations more 
likely to be accepted by stakeholders and stakeholder groups in both parties, 
even if total consensus cannot be reached73).
4.   Was International Law Powerless in the Case of the Xayaburi Dam 
Construction?
(1)  Violation of the Obligation to Provide Prior Notification in “Timely” 
Fashion
　One of the first issues raised by the Xayaburi Dam project concerned the 
timing of the notification. The 1995 Agreement stipulates that such 
notification should be “timely,” in order to “allow the other member riparians 
to discuss and evaluate the impact of the proposed use upon their uses of 
water and any other effects”74). PNPCA 4.5 stipulates that “Notification of 
proposed use shall be transmitted to the MRC JC in a timely manner prior 
to implementation” (emphasis added), while PNPCA 5.2.1 provides that “In 
71) Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 21 May, 1997, entered into 
force on 17 August, 2014, UN Doc. A/RES/51/229. Vietnam played a crucial role in 2014, 
as the 35th state to ratify the Convention, which allowed the latter to come into force, as 
35 ratifications were required before it became binding. Several scholars have claimed that 
the provisions on prior notification of planned measures in the convention are more detailed 
and stricter than the ones in the 1995 Mekong Agreement, meaning that the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention would assist in the implementation and interpretation of similar 
provisions in the 1995 Mekong Agreement. In addition, it has been suggested that Vietnam 
ratified the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention as a way of dealing with the challenges of 
governance of transboundary waters and holistic management of the riverʼs water, in view 
of the lack of substantive and procedural frameworks in the 1995 Mekong Agreement. 
Ibrahim, 2020, supra note 39, pp. 205-206.
72) 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 71, Article 33(3).
73) Jacob D. Petersen-Perlman, Jennifer C. Veilleux & Aaron T. Wolf, “International Water 
Conflict and Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities,” Water International, Vol. 42, No. 2 
(2017), p. 111.
74) 1995 Agreement, supra note 1, Chapter. II.
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addition to the data and information required for Notification, the notifying 
State shall timely provide the MRC JC with available and additional technical 
data and information on its proposed use of waters for an evaluation of 
impacts by the other riparian States...” (emphasis added). The PNPCA 
guidelines state that the “[t]ime of submission [to MRC JC] should be flexible, 
acknowledging that the MRC Secretariat requests up to one month in 
advance of intended implementation to allow for internal processing and 
distribution of the planned project to other member states”75). The PNPCA 
guidelines also elaborate on the timing of notification, by suggesting that in 
actual practice it is likely that projects for proposed water use falling within 
the “prior consultation” category would be submitted two-six months in 
advance of the intended start-up date, because they are long-term, large-
scale projects requiring considerable technical, economic, social and impact 
analyses76).
　In terms of the above, Laos did not provide neighboring governments with 
an opportunity to evaluate transboundary impacts, and did not assess them 
itself before commencing the prior consultation on 20 September, 201077). 
Therefore, Laos violated Chapter II of the 1995 Agreement and PNPCA 
5.2.1. Support for such a conclusion may be seen in the Pulp Mills Case 
between Argentina and Uruguay, which was decided by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in 201078). The ICJ held that the initial requirement to 
inform should be satisfied “at the stage when the relevant authority has had 
the project referred to it with the aim of obtaining initial environmental 
75) MRC, Guidelines on Implementation of the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation 
and Agreement, done on 31 August 2005, in Vientiane, Laos, p. 3, I. A. 1., available at http://
www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/policies/Guidelines-on-implementation-of-the-
PNPCA.pdf (last access 25 January 2020).
76) Ibid.
77) On 20 September, the Laos government submitted the Xayaburi Dam to the PNPCA 
process. Documentation included the feasibility study, and environmental and social impact 
assessments, but no assessment of the damʼs potential transboundary impact. Kirk 
Herbertson, “Xayaburi Dam: How Laos Violated the 1995 Mekong Agreement,” International 
Rivers, on 13 January, 2013, p. 19, available at https://www.internationalrivers.org/sites/
default/files/attached-files/intl_rivers_analysis_of_mekong_agreement_january_2013.pdf 
(last access 3 January 2020).
78) Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 
20 April, 2010, ICJ Reports 2010.
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authorization and before the granting of that authorization”79). The ICJ also 
observed that “the information provided will not necessarily consist of a full 
assessment of the environmental impact of the project, which will often 
require further time and resources;”80) and stated that “notification must take 
place before the State concerned decides on the environmental viability of 
the plan, taking due account of the environmental impact assessment 
submitted to it”81).
(2)  Violation of the Obligation to Suspend Construction Works During the 
Prior Consultation Period
　According to PNPCA 5.4.382), Laos was obliged to suspend the project 
during the prior consultation period. However, Laos and the developers 
involved began construction of the Xayaburi Dam in late 2010, before the 
MRC governments had even met to discuss the project. Because the Laos 
government issued a statement on 19 November 2012 that “the first stage of 
construction has begun in late 2010 and is currently on going which includes 
preparatory infrastructure works, right bank coffer dams, navigation locks, 
spillway, sediment flushing outlets, and an intermediate block”83). On 19 
April, 2011, Cambodia and Vietnam requested a delay in the project, so that 
further transboundary studies could be carried out84); however, the Laos 
government claimed that the PNPCA consultation process for the Xayaburi 
Dam automatically ended on 22 April, 201185).
　Laos asserted that, under the 1995 Agreement, “preparatory work” was 
allowed86). However, it should not be overlooked that the ICJ held, in the Pulp 
Mill Case, that, “this notification must take place before the State concerned 
79) Ibid., para. 105.
80) Ibid.
81) Ibid., para. 120.
82) PNPCA 5.4.3 provides that: “…The notifying State(s) shall not implement the proposed 
use without providing the opportunity of the other member States to discuss and evaluate 
the proposed use…”
83) Qi Gao, A Procedural Framework for Transboundary Water Management in the Mekong 
River Basin: Shared Mekong for a Common Future (Brill Nijhoff, 2014), p. 115.
84) Herbertson, 2013, supra note 77, p. 20.
85) Ibid.
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decides on the environmental viability of the plan, taking due account of the 
environmental impact assessment”87), and “Uruguay was not entitled, for the 
duration of the period of consultation and negotiation…, either to construct 
or authorize the construction of the planned mills and the port terminal.”88) 
Indeed, while the Judge Greenwood, as a separate opinion in the Pulp Mill 
Case, stated that “engaging in preliminary steps such as clearing vegetation 
from a proposed site, levelling the land or preparing foundations is unlikely 
in itself to have any adverse impact on navigation, the régime of the river or 
the quality of its waters”89), there is no doubt that the Xayaburi project went 
beyond such preparatory work. In light of the above, Laos clearly violated 
PNPCA 5.4.3.
(3)  Violation of the Obligation to Accept a Request for Extension of the 
Prior Consultation Period
　To avoid a situation where the prior consultation is left open indefinitely, 
the PNPCA procedures mandate a specific timeframe: “The timeframe for 
Prior Consultation shall be six months from the date of receiving documents 
on Prior Consultation. If necessary, an extended period shall be permitted by 
the decision of the MRC JC.”90) This language originates directly from the UN 
International Law Commissionʼs 1994 commentary on the international law 
of watercourses, and is also part of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention91). 
In sum, if a six-month timeframe is inadequate, downstream governments 
have a right to extend the consultations for a limited period of time.
　However, as aforementioned, Laos claimed that the prior consultation 
86) A Bangkok Post investigation revealed that the Laos government had already begun 
implementing the project. The investigation revealed that access roads were constructed 
and villagers had received as little as US$15 in compensation and were being resettled. 
Ibid.
87) Pulp Mills Case, 2010, supra note 78, para. 120.
88) Ibid., para. 143.
89) Ibid., Separate opinion of Judge Greenwood, para. 14.
90) PNPCA 5.5.
91) UN Doc. A/49/10 (Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-
sixth session, 2 May 22 July 1994, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth 
session, Supplement No. 10), p. 113, Article 13(b); 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, supra 
note 71, Article 13.
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ended automatically after six months. During this initial six-month period, 
Laos failed to provide the information that the other governments needed in 
order to evaluate the projectʼs impacts, and this undermined the primary 
purpose of the prior consultation. As a result, Laos violated PNPCA 5.5.2.
(4)  Inadequate response of the MRC to Laosʼ Violation of International 
Law in the Construction of the Xayaburi Dam
　In light of the Laos governmentʼs violation of international law, the 
Xayaburi experience raised the question whether the MRC can be an 
effective entity for management of the Mekong River going forward; and 
this has reduced enthusiasm for the institution in recent years, leading to 
donor disengagement and significant cuts to the MRCʼs budget. Therefore, 
analysis of the Xayaburi Dam project shows that both the design and 
implementation of the MRCʼs prior consultation process should be improved. 
The need to strengthen this process is particularly pressing in light of the 
numerous plans to further exploit the hydropower potential of the Mekong 
River and its tributaries.
B.  The Relationship Between the Lower Mekong River 
Countries and China — Chinaʼs Bilateral Approach to 
Transboundary Water Issues
　Compared to the cooperation in the lower Mekong region (for all its 
weaknesses), Chinaʼs record on prior notification and consultation for 
proposed projects on transboundary rivers is abysmal. In particular, the 
other riparian states have never been formally notified of Chinaʼs dam 
cascade plan on the upper basin of the Mekong River. China is a party to 
some 50 treaties governing or related to its shared transboundary water 
resources, with many of these concerning its borders (China has boundary 
agreements with 12 of its 14 neighbors)92), but all its transboundary water-
related agreements are bilateral, despite the fact that many relate to multi-
state basins; for example, the Heilongjiang/Amur and Kherlen Rivers are 
92) Wouters & Chen, 2013, supra note 51, pp. 245-247.
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shared between China, Russia and Mongolia; the Tumen River is shared, 
between China, Russia and North Korea; and the Irtysh River, in the northern 
part of the country, is shared by China, Kazakhstan and Russia93). Chinaʼs 
traditional bilateral approach on transboundary water domain reflects a 
profound unwillingness to sign onto multilateral legal commitments.  
　Instead, China has established a number of joint commissions responsible 
for environmental and water cooperation with its neighbors, all at a bilateral 
level. These include the Sino-Kazakh Joint Commission on the Use and 
Protection of Transboundary Rivers, the Sino-Kazakh Commission on 
Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, the Sino-Mongolian 
Joint Commission on Transboundary Waters and the Sino-Russian Joint 
Commission on the Reasonable Utilization and Protection of Transboundary 
Waters94). These joint commissions have similar remits, which usually include 
information exchange, water quality monitoring, joint scientific research and 
emergency response cooperation95).
　Currently the LMC is far from a multilateral cooperation system for 
achieving integrated water management in the Mekong basin. It is likely 
that China is merely using it as means and tools for establishing a new 
economic zone of influence, as part of the broader economic and diplomatic 
zone envisaged by its Belt and Road Initiative. In light of Chinaʼs bilateralism, 
it is feared that the LMC, in reality, is likely to reflect Chinaʼs uniformly 
bilateral approach, with China as the overwhelming presence, instead of 
reflecting a multilateral approach the limits Chinese hegemony. Given the 
current state of the 1995 Agreement and Chinaʼs very limited acceptance of 
multilateral cooperation, constructing and strengthening of multilateral 
cooperative mechanism would appear to be a more effective way forward in 
the Mekong River region.
93) Ibid., p. 232.




III. The Need to Reform the Existing Transboundary 
Mechanisms of Water Resource Management in the Mekong 
River Basin in Accordance with the Rule of International Law
A.  Two Requirements for Reform
1.  Documentation of Customary and Evolving International Law
　Two specific initiatives would enable the MRC and LMC to better manage 
the Mekong River basin. The first is the documentation of customary and 
evolving international law. It is important that the substantive obligations 
and procedures of customary international law on the use of international 
rivers are legally binding. Document-based lawmaking is of particular 
importance in this context because in general terms, laws not written on 
paper, such as customary international law, are less likely to be implemented 
by countries than those articulated in formal legal documents. In particular, 
it is important to document the procedural obligations of customary 
international law. The recent development of transboundary environmental 
impact assessment (TbEIA) is particularly noteworthy96). TbEIA refers to 
procedures for evaluating the likely impact of proposed activities on the 
environment of other countries97), and is usually undertaken by the project 
planning state.
　TbEIA obligations are subdivided into four sequential phases: (i) the 
obligation to determine whether it is necessary to conduct TbEIA98); (ii) the 
obligation to conduct TbEIA (including the obligation to notify and consult 
in good faith with the potentially affected states in conformity with due 
diligence obligation)99); (iii) a final decision regarding TbEIA, by the project 
planning state; (iv) the obligation to continuously monitor conditions100) after 
structures such as dams has been completed and put into operation, and/or 
96) E.g. Mari Koyano, “The Significance of Procedural Obligations in International 
Environmental Law: Sovereignty and International Co-operation,” Japanese Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. 54 (2011), p. 98.
97) E.g. Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle & Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the 
Environment, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 164.
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water diversions are completed101). These obligations should be documented 
by all the countries in the Mekong basin. There is evidence of documentation 
98) The ICJ held that “to fulfill its obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing significant 
transboundary environmental harm, a State must, before embarking on an activity having 
the potential to adversely affect the environment of another State, ascertain if there is a 
risk of significant transboundary harm, which triggers the requirement to carry out an 
environmental impact assessment.” Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the 
Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the 
San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), Judgment of 16 December 2015, ICJ Reports 2015, 
para. 104. In other words, a project planning state need not necessarily perform TbEIA for 
every project. Prior to conducting TbEIA, the planning state must determine that one is 
needed. In this obligation, the planning state will only be required to perform TbEIA if it 
determines that its proposed project could have an adverse effect on the environment of 
another state. In this case, it has the obligation to perform TbEIA, as set forth in (ii) above.
99) In the Pulp Mills Case, the ICJ found that there is a practice, “which in recent years has 
gained so much acceptance among States that it may now be considered a requirement 
under general international law, to undertake an environmental impact assessment where 
there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact 
in a transboundary context, in particular, on shared resource.” Pulp Mills Case, 2010, supra 
note 78, para. 204. This view has been overwhelmingly supported by subsequent 
international cases and subsequent scholarly opinion. Specifically, the ICJʼs judgment in the 
Pulp Mills Case seems to have persuaded legal scholars. E.g. Nicolas C. Bremer, 
“Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment of Large Dams in the Euphrates-
Tigris Region: An Analysis of International Law Binding Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey,” 
Review of European Community & International Environmental Law (RECIEL), Vol. 25, 
No. 1 (2016), pp. 99-100. The ICJ considered international law defining the content of TbEIA 
in the Pulp Mills Case. While the court found that states are generally free in determining 
the scope of TbEIA through domestic legislation, it noted that in doing so, a state, must 
have “regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed development and its likely 
adverse impact on the environment as well as the need to exercise due diligence in 
conducting such an assessment.” Pulp Mills Case, 2010, supra note 78, para. 205. An 
important question that arises in this context is whether the EIA must necessarily involve 
consultation with potentially affected populations. While some maintain that states may be 
obligated by international law to provide for foreign public participation in EIA, legal 
scholars generally do not consider states to be obligated to allow the participation of 
foreign populations. The question arose in the Pulp Mills Case, but the court merely 
concluded that no legal duty to consult the affected populations existed for Uruguay on the 
basis of the “instruments invoked by Argentina,” and that, in any event, a consultation had 
taken place. Ibid., paras. 216, 219. This conclusion does not settle the issue, however, 
because the court avoided the question whether an obligation to consult the public exists 
in customary international law. Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Jorge E. Viñuales, International 
Environmental Law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 80.
100) Monitoring entails the measurement, assessment, and analysis of the impact of the 
activities. Exchange of information entails the mutual distribution of relevant scientific or 
technical data and information that may include the outcome of monitoring. Koyano, 2011, 
supra note 96, p. 101.
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of TbEIA obligations among the lower Mekong countries102), but no procedural 
obligations between China and the lower Mekong countries have thus far 
been documented.
2.  Reforming the LMC and MRC as Existing Cooperation Mechanisms
　The second reform initiative involves restructuring the existing 
management mechanisms for water resource to strengthen their authority. 
The 1995 Agreement only provides a mechanism for dialogue; the existing 
methods remain unable to resolve conflicts. In order, therefore, to effectively 
implement procedural and substantive obligations, the existing mechanisms 
must be reformed in the manner detailed below. In the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros 
Case, where the states were mandated to find a negotiated solution, the 
court went on to state that the “[r]e-establishment of the joint régime will 
also reflect in an optimal way the concept of common utilization of shared 
water resources”103). This raises the question of how these mechanisms 
should be designed.
101) As an example, in the Pulp Mills Case, the ICJ held that “once operations have started 
and, where necessary, throughout the life of the project, continuous monitoring of its effects 
on the environment shall be undertaken.” Pulp Mills Case, 2010, supra note 78, para. 205. 
This requirement builds upon Vice-President Weeramantryʼs statements in the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros Case regarding the need for continuous EIA. Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, 
Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, pp. 20-21. ICJ also held that “if the 
circumstances so require, Costa Rica will have to consult in good faith with Nicaragua, 
which is sovereign over the San Juan River, to determine the appropriate measures to 
prevent significant transboundary harm or minimize the risk thereof.” Certain Activities 
and Construction of a Road Case, 2015, supra note 98, para. 173.
102) See MRC, Guidelines for Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment in the Lower 
Mekong Basin (Working Document), Vientiane, Laos, on 25 September 2018, available at 
http ://www.mrcmekong .org/assets/Publ icat ions/TbEIA-Guidel ines -Final -
version-25-9-2018.pdf (last access 18 December 2019). The adoption of this document was 
postponed because the Laos and Thai governments disapproved. Laos and Thailand 
suggested that the current draft guidelines should be considered as a “working document” 
that can be further amended based on experience gained from its practical application. 
Ibid.
103) Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 
September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, para. 147.
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B.  How Should the Existing Mechanisms be Reformed?
1.  Three Perspectives
　In order to achieve a cooperative management mechanism, the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention merely recommends the establishment of “joint 
mechanisms or commissions”104), whereas other treaties such as the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on the 
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 
(hereinafter the “1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention”)105) require their 
establishment. Joint mechanisms are useful vehicles for coordinated 
management because they provide platforms for regular interaction, 
information exchange and decision-making among basin states106).
　There are three distinct aspects to reforming the existing mechanisms in 
the Mekong basin (see Figure 4). First, information on dams and water levels 
should be regularly exchanged through a multilateral forum for conflict 
prevention and resolution (hereinafter “Phase I”). Inevitably, procedural 
obligations are closely linked to the establishment of cooperative institutional 
mechanisms, through which the formal exchange of environmental 
information and inter-state dialogue can take place, and by which detailed 
procedural rules on such exchange can be developed and implemented. The 
Mekong River is no exception: a mechanism is needed for the basin 
governments and ministries to regularly exchange information through a 
combined forum. In the lower Mekong River region, the NMCs should 
periodically exchange such information through the MRC; and at the same 
time, the LMC can function as a broader forum for achieving integrated 
management of the entire Mekong River basin.
104) 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 71, Article 8(2).
105) Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes, done at Helsinki, on 17 March 1992, entered into force 6 October 1996, ILM, Vol. 31 
(1992), p. 1312, Article 9(2).
106) Christina Leb, “The Significance of the Duty to Cooperate for Transboundary Water 
Resources Management under International Water Law,” in Alistair Rieu-Clarke, Andrew 




　Second, there should be a multilateral forum in which all basin countries 
participate, and any country should be able to bring a dispute with another 
country to the forum for a legally-binding decision (hereinafter “Phase II”). In 
the case of the Mekong River, the LMC already offers a forum in which all 
basin countries can participate. All basin countries should submit a report to 
the LMC (and the MRC in the case of the lower Mekong River basin) on the 
current status of their water management, and the LMC should review the 
reports in light of information from citizens and NGOs, and order basin 
countries to make improvements as necessary. Additionally, in the event of 
a disagreement (that is, conflict) between national institutions regarding the 
fulfillment of the various obligations above (see Section III A 1), the LMC 
should be empowered to make legally binding decisions if there is a request 
from any country.
　Finally, an international supervisory body should be established to monitor 
the implementation of decisions made by the multilateral forum (hereinafter 
“Phase III”). In addition, this body should have the authority of an institution 
of appeal, if it is dissatisfied with the decision by the multilateral forum. In 
the case of the Mekong River, for example, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), major 
multilateral development banks such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and 
the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) would be 
Source: Author
Figure 4: Proposed institutional design for the Mekong River basin
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appropriate as such a supervisory body107).
　It is important that all basin countries agree to certain restrictions on 
sovereignty. The strong institutional capacity in the proposed Mekong River 
basin design is expected to restrain any hegemon from acting unilaterally, 
thanks to its enforcement and conflict resolution mechanisms.
　In fact, Phase I is already underway. Data and information exchange, 
basin-wide monitoring, and joint assessment on Mekong water and related 
resources are among the main element to benefit from the new partnership 
between the MRC Secretariat and the LMC Water Center108). As an initial 
step, both sides (i.e., the upper and lower riparian states) agreed to conduct 
a joint study on the 2019 drought and low-flow situation in the overall 
Mekong River basin, including both the lower and upper part in China where 
the Mekong is known as Lancang109). The joint study, planned for January to 
September 2020, aimd to identify the causes and impacts of the drought and 
low-flow conditions in 2019110). Though the study will likely touch on sensitive 
issues, such as water quality and Chinaʼs upstream dam construction, the 
agreement also highlights the potential for increased cooperation throughout 
the basin and strengthening engagement with China.
2.  How Can Chinaʼs Cooperation be Obtained?
　In the Mekong River basin, however, neither Phase II nor III is yet 
underway. Is it possible to institutionalize these Phases in the overall basin 
and establish the rule of international law? Where mutual benefits have been 
identified, states have agreed to subject themselves to specific obligations in 
order to achieve favorable outcomes through coordination and cooperation 
in the management and development of shared water resources111). In the 
107) See also Muhammad Uzair Qamar, Muhammad Azmat & Pierluigi Claps, “Pitfalls in 
Transboundary Indus Water Treaty: A Perspective to Prevent Unattended Threats to the 
Global Security,” npj Clean Water, Vol. 2, No. 22 (2019), p. 3.
108) MRC Website, MRC Secretariat, LMC Water Center ink first MOU for better upper-lower 
Mekong management (Vientiane, Laos, on 18 December 2019), available at http://www.
mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-secretariat-lmc-water-center-ink-first-mou-





Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case, for example, the ICJ considered the delicate 
balance between economic utilization and environmental protection, and 
recommended that dams “could be made to function in such a way as to 
accommodate both the economic operation of the system of electricity 
generation and the satisfaction of essential environmental concerns.”112)
　In this respect, it is noteworthy that China has accepted “limited 
sovereignty” in its evolving water governance agreements with downstream 
Kazakhstan. In 2001, China and Kazakhstan signed a landmark agreement 
on the use and protection of transboundary rivers113), which in turn led to the 
establishment, in 2003, of the Sino-Kazakh Joint Commission on the Use and 
Protection of Transboundary Rivers114); and both countries have continued to 
take steps to enter a new stage of common water governance. In early 2011, 
China finalized an agreement on water quality protection along shared rivers 
with Kazakhstan115); and in April 2011, the two countries launched the long-
awaited China-Kazakhstan Friendship Joint Water Diversion Project on the 
Khorgos River, a 150-kilometre long tributary of the lli and a boarder river 
between the countries116). Under the agreement, each side is allotted 50% of 
the diverted water117).
　It is entirely unclear, however, whether Chinaʼs cooperation with 
Kazakhstan will be reflected its dealings with the lower Mekong River 
countries; beyond the reasons discussed above, there is a critical difference 
between water diversion and dam-building. The former is typically unfair 
111) Leb, 2017, supra note 106, p. 254.
112) Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case, 1997, supra note 103, para. 146.
113) Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government
of the Peopleʼs Republic of China on Cooperation in the Use and Protection of
Transboundary Rivers, Astana, on 12 September 2001, Article 8, available at http://www.
cawater-info.net/library/eng/l/kazakhstan_china.pdf (last access 24 December 2019).
114) Ho, 2017, supra note 4, pp. 145-146.
115) Sebastian Biba, “China cooperates with Central Asia over shared rivers,” chinadialogue, 
on 24 February 2014, available at https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/
en/6741-China-cooperates-with-Central-Asia-over-shared-rivers- (last access 24 December 
2019).
116) Ibid. Zhanggui Zhou & Ruolin Wang, “Sino-Kazakh transboundary water cooperation: 
History, current status, and future priorities,” in Hongzhou Zhang & Mingjiang Li (eds.), 
China and Transboundary Water Politics in Asia (Routledge, 2018), p. 198.
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because it deprives downstream countries of water; but in the latter case 
China need not feel compelled to justify its action because the same amount 
of water will continue to flow downstream118).
　Nevertheless, the progress of cooperation between China and Kazakhstan 
on water resource management suggests that linkages between water 
governance and broader political, strategic and economic issues have 
incentivized China, as the upstream riparian, to cooperate with Kazakhstan, 
a weaker downstream neighbor119). China, it seems, has determined that the 
benefits of cooperation are greater than the benefits of non-cooperation, 
when the distribution of the net benefits is perceived to be fair.  
　Such linkages seem clearly to be incentives for Chinaʼs relatively higher 
level of cooperation in the case of Kazakhstan. Therefore, issue-linkages 
would appear to be of critical importance in any attempt to establish the rule 
of international law in dealings with China regarding the water resources in 
the upper Mekong River, including the establishment of the above-mentioned 
water resource management institutional design (see Figure 4). Chinaʼs 
proven behavior regarding de facto cooperation strongly suggests that 
shared interests — such as trade and investment opportunities, and political 
interest in cooperation with downstream countries — help to promote 
mutually beneficial cooperative arrangements.
Conclusion
　Ultimately, the most important factor in the management of transboundary 
water resources in the Mekong River basin is the promotion of public 
117) Since diplomatic relations were established in 1992, the Kazakh government has tried to 
nudge China to begin negotiations on the management of shared water resources. These 
efforts met with little success until the late 1990s. Chinaʼs decision to come to the negotiating 
table in May 1999 suggested that Chinaʼs cooperation on transboundary waters was a quid 
pro quo for Kazakhstanʼs support in the mid-to-late 1990s for Chinaʼs campaign against 
Uighur separatists, as well as its facilitation of Chinese access to its energy resources. Ho, 
2017, supra note 4, p. 151.
118) Biba, 2014, supra note 115.
119) Selina Ho, “Sharing Rivers: China & Kazakhstan,” China Water Risk (CWR), on 18 May 
2017, available at http://www.chinawaterrisk.org/opinions/sharing-rivers-china-
kazakhstan/ (last access 24 December 2019).
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participation. The participation of stakeholders, such as citizens, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and companies, in the mechanism will 
help to protect the Mekong River and its residents from irresponsible dam 
development and other water-related malgovernance120).
　Public participation can be broadly understood as an institutionalized form 
of involvement on behalf of the basin stakeholders, including basin 
communities and NGOs as well as private businesses, in the management 
and decision-making process of river basin organizations. The benefits of 
public participation may be summarized in terms of three broad sets of 
anticipated outcomes: ensuring greater “efficiency and effectiveness” in 
policies and project outcomes; increasing the “empowerment” of individuals, 
especially those in marginalized groups; and increasing the “legitimacy” of 
governance measures121).
　However, such public participation has yet to be codified in internationally 
binding water law. For example, the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention 
contains no explicit obligations for public participation. In contrast, however, 
an increasing number of regional water conventions includes provisions for 
public involvement. The 1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention, for 
example, requires that “information on the conditions of transboundary 
waters, measures taken or planned to be taken to prevent, control and 
reduce transboundary impact, and the effectiveness of those measures, is 
made available to the public”122); and the Aarhus Convention, launched by the 
UNECE in 1998, requires public access to information, decision-making, and 
justice on matters of national, regional, and transboundary issues including 
water, though limited to a specific list of activities.
　The construction and operation of large upstream dams in the Mekong 
120) The idea of increased public participation in environmental issues has been affirmed in 
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration. This formulation suggests that public participation is 
important not only as a distributive instrument (weighing the interests at stake), but also, 
to some extent, as an instrument of prevention, through the democratic control of decision-
making in environmental matters. Dupuy & Viñuales, 2018, supra note 99, p. 86.
121) Sabine Schulze, “Public Participation in the Governance of Transboundary Water 
Resources － Mechanisms Provided by River Basin Organizations,” Centre international de 
formation européenne, No. 365 (2012), p. 51.
122) 1992 UNECE Watercourses Convention, supra note 105, Article 16.
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basin are posing unprecedented risks to the downstream region. Establishing 
the rule of international law is too late after the river has dried up, with its 
serious consequences for civil society. In order to achieve sustainable 
development of the Mekong River basin, there is an urgent need to establish 
a method of public participation in the decision-making process; in effect, to 
establish the “rule of international law with public participation”.
